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The protection of the financial interests of the European Union and the defence of the European financial system are two as-
pirations that have accompanied the European Union since its foundation. They are part of the nature of the Union, which was 
born to overcome the economic crisis installed in Europe after the Second World War. Today, such objectives have been rec-
ognized in the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The undeni-
able economic imprint of the Union is shown in the different areas in which its legislative activity is carried out. The ambitious 
financial policy only makes sense on a solid economic and financial context, which requires the protection of the budget and 
the prevention and sanction of conducts undermining the economic pillars. The European Public Prosecutor´s Office (EPPO) 
marks the turning point in criminal policy that seeks to strengthen the fight against fraud. In this legal context, it is interesting 
to highlight two aspects. First, the European legislator understands that criminal law is the most effective instrument to com-
bat fraudulent activities affecting the financial interests of the Union; as a consequence, criminal law becomes a prima ratio 
barrier against crime. Second, the EPPO will be the only body to investigate and prosecute such crimes. The objective of this 
article is to analyse these aspects and reflect on the limits on the material competence attributed to the EPPO.
essary balance between the philosophical-legal principles and 
postulates of the national legal systems and the Union system. 
The EPPO was not conceived as an indispensable element in 
development of the Union’s criminal policy, because, in an 
area based on the principle of mutual recognition and mutual 
trust, the recognition and implementation of judicial deci-
sions would be very quick. Nevertheless, the States have not 
achieved the expected results, and the success of the anti-fraud 
policy has been very limited. Instead, the EPPO was presented 
as an instrument of added value, around which the legal ar-
chitecture of future criminal policy tactics for protecting the 
EU’s financial interests would revolve, the measures and deci-
sions of the EPPO becoming immediately effective in the EU 
Member States.
This article generally aims to provide a better understanding 
of the importance that this new supranational body to fight 
EU fraud acquired in the current legal context of the protec-
tion of the EU’s financial interests. Against this background, 
it analyses three aspects: Based on the decision of the Euro-
pean legislator, which raised criminal law to the category of 
the most effective instrument to protect financial interest, the 
article first examines the evolution of the fight against fraud 
and the legal environment in which the EPPO operates, and 
second, the basic concept of the fight against fraud as provided 
in the Treaty of Lisbon. The third section takes a closer look 
at EPPO’s material competence before final remarks on the 
subject matter are made. 
I. Introduction
The economy is an essential pillar of the European Union, and 
as its development largely depends on the solidity of the finan-
cial system, it was necessary to ensure that the Member States 
recognised the legal requirements that justified the Union’s de-
cisions to protect the financial interests. Since its foundation, 
the European Union has been committed to fighting fraud, 
promoting different policies to prevent any criminal conduct 
that could affect the economic and financial pillars. We could 
understand, then, that the decision to provide the legal bases 
to implement a new criminal structure against fraud is justified 
by the fact that the action of a single body, with competence 
to investigate and prosecute in the area of freedom, security 
and justice, augurs a greater success for this purpose. But the 
Member States belong to different legal families and each na-
tional law is inspired by different legal principles. Therefore, it 
was essential that the EU Member States accept the anti-fraud 
solutions offered by the Union in their legal system. As a con-
sequence, it would also become necessary to adopt means or 
instruments to resolve conflicts of jurisdiction between States 
and incompatibilities arising between the solutions offered by 
the Union and those offered by national laws. In this context, 
the Treaty of Lisbon entailed a qualitative breakthrough in the 
European Union’s fight against economic and financial crime. 
Proof of this, is the creation of a centralised European Public 
Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) with exclusive competence to inves-
tigate and prosecute such offences. But, one of the most complex 
aspects was to reflect in Regulation (EU) 2017/19391 the nec-
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II. The legal Environment in which the EPPO Operates
To put the above-mentioned preliminary considerations in a 
nutshell, the fight against fraud affecting the European Union’s 
financial interests is undoubtedly one of the most important 
objectives of Europe’s current criminal policy.2 At the mo-
ment, we have a legal system made up of administrative and 
criminal rules, instruments, and bodies that serves the purpose 
of countering fraud affecting the European Union and recover-
ing the amounts that have been defrauded. In order to accom-
plish these objectives, it was necessary to involve the Member 
States for two reasons: first, the European Union lacked crimi-
nal sanctioning legitimacy before the entering into force of the 
TFEU and, therefore, it could only operate through the States; 
second, in order to protect the Union’s financial interests, 
Member States remain essential for the effective functioning 
of the system provided for in the TFEU.
Let us briefly call to mind the most recent developments in the 
fight against fraud in the EU. Since the Convention on the pro-
tection of the European Communities’ financial interests (PIF 
Convention),3 with its Protocols, and the 1997 Action Plan to 
combat organized crime,4 which took shape in Joint Action 
98/742/JHA on corruption in the private sector,5 the rules on 
fighting fraud progressed towards the current legislation. To-
day, Art. 325 TFEU imposes an obligation on Member States 
to create an internal procedural regime to protect the financial 
interests through the adoption of dissuasive and effective mea-
sures, without establishing specific criteria or methods in this 
regard. However, the introduction of the EPPO into the orga-
nizational structure of the fight against fraud and the fact that 
it is (exclusively) competent for investigating fraud crimes (in 
their many forms) means an alteration of the rules and prin-
ciples in that the domestic legal order enables specification 
of the competent institutions and bodies for investigation and 
prosecution.6 Following the mandate given in Art. 86 TFEU, 
the domestic legal authorities will be excluded in favor of the 
EPPO, as the centralized body of the European Union has ex-
clusive competence to investigate crimes affecting the Union’s 
financial interests.
We should not forget that economic crime has evolved, and this 
evolution has had a strong influence on the selection of legal 
strategies to combat such crime and prevent its results. These 
forms of crime entail extraordinarily sophisticated methods, 
and new opportunities in the financial system to mask such 
illicit activities are regularly found. Logically, the absence of 
controls on economic traffic between financial entities oper-
ating within the European Economic Area is due to mutual 
trust between Member States. But these circumstances have 
led to an increase in the use of financial channels for laun-
dering illegally obtained profits, just as they have also been 
used to finance terrorist activities within the Union’s territory. 
The obligations for financial institutions, established by the 
EU’s AML legislation7, to adopt a set of compulsory compli-
ance measures,8 in order to control risky financial operations, 
means that financial institutions have also become, to some 
extent, instruments of criminal law in the fight against fraud. 
Therefore, the degree of involvement and commitment in this 
area is not only binding on the European Union and on the 
State authorities (judicial, police, or administrative). Indeed, 
both public and private financial institutions (and certain pro-
fessionals who manage several types of economic transactions 
or may be aware of doubtful aspects of their clients’ financial 
activities) must also act as bodies of the criminal law system 
and are entrusted with the task of being a kind of first response 
in preventing fraud. 
Given the need to protect the financial interests, the European 
legislator has been forced to regulate aspects of certain con-
duct that has traditionally been linked to fraudulent activities. 
This is the case, for example, for corruption, which is some-
times clearly linked to fraud. Thus, the Commission’s report 
on anti-corruption policy, published in February 2014, recog-
nised that corruption affected all Member States without ex-
ception and that its cost to the Union’s economy at the time 
amounted to some €120 billion per year.9 In the same way, and 
as the Commission already indicated in 2004 in its Commu-
nication to the Council and the European Parliament on the 
prevention of and fight against organised crime in the finan-
cial sector,10 such corruption offences include money launder-
ing, financial fraud, and counterfeiting of the euro. Therefore, 
in 2014, based on the Pericles 2020 Programme, Regulation 
(EU) No. 331/2014,11 established in its Art. 12(1) that the 
Commission shall take measures “ensuring that (…) the fi-
nancial interest of the Union shall be protected by the appli-
cation of preventive measures against fraud, corruptions and 
any other illegal activities (…).” Art. 3 of the same Regulation 
also indicates that the principal objective shall be to prevent 
and combat counterfeiting and related fraud, thus enhancing 
the competitiveness of the Union’s economy and securing the 
sustainability of public finances. 
In the same vein, Directive 2014/62/EU12 on the protection of 
the euro and other currencies against counterfeiting by crimi-
nal law was approved, providing the anti-fraud strategy with a 
new instrument. It stressed the need to criminally investigate 
acts of counterfeiting by means of more effective rules and 
allowing for the establishment of common penalties for the 
most serious offences. In 2017, the PIF Directive13 specified 
that certain types of conduct against the common tax system, 
and against budget expenditure and revenue items, should be 
made punishable in all Member States by laying down com-
mon minimum penalties and specifying the substantive ele-
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ments of criminal law that must be incorporated into national 
legal systems (minimum standards). In 2019, the European 
Parliament recognized that “many Member States do not have 
specific laws against organised crime, while its involvement in 
cross-border activities and sectors affecting the EU’s financial 
interests, such as smuggling or counterfeiting of currency, is 
constantly growing.”14
The importance of the measures outlined above has not been 
lost. In order to strengthen the fight against fraud, the Euro-
pean Union has increased its budget by €181 million for the 
next multiannual financial period 2021–2027. It supposes evi-
dent support for the efforts of the Member States in the fight 
against corruption and other irregularities affecting revenue 
and expenditure items.15 In addition, the legislation on fraud 
committed through non-cash means of payment16 was also re-
cently addressed. 
In this context, the provision of Art. 22(3) of Regulation (EU) 
2017/1939 makes sense: “[t]he EPPO shall also be competent 
for any other criminal offence that is inextricably linked to 
criminal conduct that falls within the scope of paragraph 1 of 
this Article.” But the competence, with regard to such criminal 
offences, may only be exercised in conformity with Art. 25(3). 
In any case, Regulation 2017/1939 opens up a new stage in the 
fight against fraud.17
III. The Fight against Fraud for Protecting Financial 
Interests in the Treaty of lisbon
The provision on the harmonisation of criminal law – 
Art. 83(1) TFEU –, refers to a list of criminal areas that do not 
explicitly include the crime of fraud against the Union’s finan-
cial interest. Paradoxically, the EPPO has been designed as 
the only body with exclusive competence to investigate such 
crimes – Art. 86(2) TFEU. We have to resort to the “Financial 
Provisions” of the Treaty to find the regulation concerning the 
fight against fraud in Art. 325 TFEU. Specifically, the referen-
tial rule contained in Art. 310(6) TFEU directs us to Art. 325, 
which establishes, in its first paragraph, the guidelines for 
building the legal architecture that will protect the EU’s finan-
cial interests. As we can read in this article, the Member States 
may be the first barrier to controlling crime, and the measures 
adopted by national legislators for this purpose may have a 
clear dissuasive effect. The effectiveness of the measures cho-
sen should definitely place Member States in a position to offer 
the protection required by the Union.
Based on the principle of assimilation, paragraph 2 of Art. 325 
TFEU demands that the Member States protect the Union’s 
financial interests against fraud with the same diligence and 
the same measures they would apply to combating domestic 
fraud. For its part, paragraph 3 lays down the duty of the Mem-
ber States to coordinate their actions and strategies through the 
Commission, which is the coordinating and monitoring body 
(as in the pre-Lisbon phase).
In any case, we should take into account the differences be-
tween the regulation on judicial cooperation in criminal mat-
ters – Arts. 82 to 86 TFEU – and the regulation on the fight 
against fraud – Art. 325 TFEU (placed in the economic context 
of the Treaty). It seems that the legislator intended to make 
an express statement on the separation between the crimes of 
Art. 83 and the crimes of fraud affecting the financial inter-
ests. The latter seemingly deserves special treatment within 
the criminal law because this is the only instrument that of-
fers the dissuasive measures required by Art. 325. Moreover, 
if Art. 86(1) and (2) TFEU – the provisions on judicial coop-
eration in criminal matters – expressly state the competence 
of the EPPO to investigate fraud against the Union’s financial 
interests,18 regardless of the fact that this legal proceeding is 
found in the financial provisions of the TFEU, it is easy to 
understand why the legislator believed that the fight against 
fraud must be tackled by means of criminal law, giving it such 
importance that a specific criminal law enforcement body was 
created for this purpose. The creation of such measures and 
bodies for crimes of different nature never had been proposed 
before. In conclusion, we can understand that, for these finan-
cial offences, the concept provided for in the Lisbon Treaty 
combines criminal cooperation with a certain nuance of crimi-
nal integration, clearly advancing the initial idea of approxi-
mation or harmonization of the legislation. 
IV. material competence of the EPPO
The provision on the material competence of the EPPO – 
Art. 22 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 – makes reference to 
the offences in the PIF Directive “as implemented in national 
law.” In this Article, the European legislator takes on the man-
date established in Art. 83(1) TFEU, which requires the estab-
lishment of minimum rules concerning the definition of crimi-
nal offences and sanctions in the areas of particularly serious 
crime with a cross-border dimension. However, the European 
legislator is also aware of the differences between national 
laws. This supposes that the transposition of the Directive´s 
rules will not be homogeneous and, therefore, the applica-
tion of the original mandate of the EPPO based on the Direc-
tives will not be homogeneous either. Since Regulation (EU) 
2017/1939 subjects the EPPO’s actions to the regulation of the 
system in which it operates, this approach must accept occur-
ring procedural differences, e.g., the regulations on (gathering 
and use of) evidence, and the possibilities for participation of 
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victims or other parties in the criminal process. Such proce-
dural differences may constitute obstacles that are difficult to 
overcome when attempting to ensure identical protection of 
the rights at stake. So, there will be differences in the criminal 
investigation (depending on the State where the EPPO investi-
gates) and there will be differences in the judgement (depend-
ing on the transposition of the PIF Directive). 
Coming back to the EPPO’s material competence, we can see 
that there is a connection between fraud – as the generic area 
of crime defined in Art. 1 of the PIF Directive and Art. 22 of 
Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 that the EPPO is competent for 
– and other illegal acts. Effectively, the Union’s financial in-
terests can be damaged not only by acts that directly manifest 
fraud, but also through activities that mask the same fraudulent 
purpose or cause the same effect without, apparently, consti-
tuting fraud. 
The link between other offences and fraud may lead to an al-
teration of the initial competence to investigate – or may even 
extend the EPPO’s competence. The offences provided for in 
the PIF Directive do not usually occur autonomously and in 
isolation, because some of them, like money laundering, e.g., 
require at least a previous illicit activity whose proceeds are 
to be introduced into licit economic trafficking. These “laun-
dered” amounts may be intended to finance other illegal activi-
ties. Hence, Art. 3(4) lit. d) of the 4th Anti-Money Laundering 
Directive19 − when defining the notion of “criminal activity” as 
a predicate offence of money laundering that triggers measures 
for the prevention of the illegal use of the financial system – 
makes reference to “fraud affecting the financial interests of 
the Union” and thus indirectly refers to the PIF Directive. The 
PIF Directive itself states in Art. 4(1) that money laundering, 
as described in Art. 1(3) of the 4th AML Directive, may be 
one of the acts affecting the Union’s financial interests. This 
possible link between money laundering and infringement of 
the Union’s financial interests is the point at which the EPPO’s 
competence with regard to such offences is triggered. We must 
also interpret the provisions of the PIF Directive in this context. 
As a consequence, the European legislator established a sys-
tem of general protection against fraud by adopting a set of 
rules that both protect the financial system and prevent its 
misuse through laundering the illicit proceeds of crime or fi-
nancing terrorist activities in operations that mask fraud. In the 
latter case, we can see that there is an additional connection 
between laundering and fraud, as terrorist organisations are fi-
nanced through illegal activities, which, by their very nature, 
are directly linked to acts of fraud in their various forms. 
Ultimately, it is worth highlighting that many cross-border 
criminal activities mentioned in Art. 83(1) TFEU are con-
nected to fraud, because trafficking in arms, drugs, or human 
beings, as well as organised crime generate a type of fraud 
affecting the Union´s budget items. Therefore, the competence 
of the EPPO may also be activated in those criminal areas 
described in Art. 83 TFEU, if the connection between those 
crimes and any other activity that affects the financial interests of 
the Union are proved, under the condition that the other require-
ments foreseen in the Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 were met.
Closer inspection in this context reveals that Art. 22(3) and 
Art. 25 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1939, which regulate the EP-
PO’s competence if offences are inextricably linked with the 
criminal offences affecting the financial interests of the Union, 
are provided for in the PIF Directive (Art. 22(1) of the Regula-
tion). We learn from these provisions that the EPPO’s compe-
tence is given under the following conditions:
 There is an inseparable (inextricable) link between a crimi-
nal offence and a PIF offence;
 The criminal conduct that can be subsumed in one of of-
fences provided for by the PIF Directive (as outlined in 
Art. 22(1) of the Regulation) is sanctioned by the national 
law of the affected State with a higher penalty than the sanc-
tion provided for the linked criminal offence at issue.
However, the Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 has established one 
exception to the above rule: if the PIF offence were not con-
sidered the main offence, the competence to investigate will 
shift away from de EPPO. And this, regardless of the penalties 
proscribed for each of the related crimes.
If several victims are affected by the criminal offence(s), 
Art. 25(3) lit. b) of the Regulation attributes competence to the 
EPPO only when the damage caused to the Union’s financial 
interests exceeds the damage caused to another victim. If this 
is not the case, the domestic authorities have competence to 
investigate the crime. However, this latter rule is subject to a 
further exception: the EPPO is always competent as regards 
the fraud offences referred to in Art. 3(2) lit. a), b) and d) of the 
PIF Directive.20 Yet another exception in relation to Art. 25(3) 
lit. b) is provided for in Art. 25(4) of the EPPO Regulation, 
which recognizes the competence of the EPPO if it appears 
that the EPPO is better placed to investigate or prosecute. 
V. Final remarks
The European Union’s strategy in the fight against fraud has 
shifted towards criminal law. In order to defend the Union’s 
financial system, dissuasive criminal measures and other ad-
vanced legal options must be used. The effectiveness of such 
measures is not only based on sanctioning of the criminal con-
duct affecting the Union’s financial interests, but also on the 
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probability of suffering a criminal sanction. That sanctioning 
perspective acts as a preventive and dissuasive barrier against 
crime.
The prevention of financial fraud is problematic, however, and 
requires a multidisciplinary solution. The choice of a single 
type of measure, e.g. criminal measures, should not discrimi-
nate others, e.g., solutions in the administrative law field.21 
It is necessary to create a comprehensive protection barrier 
against crime. Otherwise, the barrier would be broken allow-
ing authors of a crime to find legal loopholes or systematic 
vulnerabilities. Faced with this circumstance, the legislators 
both at the European and national levels have implemented a 
set of measures – criminal compliance measures –, that must 
be incorporated and managed by entities operating in the fi-
nancial system. These actors are obliged to control the legality 
of financial operations or economic transactions, minimizing 
in this way crime risks to the financial system. Consequently, 
the effectiveness of the fight against fraud depends on the real 
interconnection between measures agreed in the field of crimi-
nal law and those that must be adopted in the field of civil, 
commercial, and administrative law. This approach especially 
articulates with the decision to set up the European Public 
Prosecutor’s Office. This is not only because of the novelty 
that this new body implies and the expectations (and doubts) 
that it generates, but also because of the special relationship 
between the EU Member States and the European Union. In 
this context, we should keep in mind that the EPPO has a 
double facet: it is a body of the European Union – the first 
body of the Union responsible for criminal prosecution22 − 
independent from the Member States, and, paradoxically 
and simultaneously, requiring close cooperation with the 
Member States. 
It is certain that the true value of the EPPO cannot be proven 
through theoretical analysis and studies. It is necessary to wait 
for its operational activity. However, today we can already ob-
serve that the European Union and the Member States have 
taken a step that will change the foundations of the national 
criminal and procedural laws. The EPPO cannot be considered 
an isolated body because it assumes competences that hitherto 
belonged to national law enforcement bodies and it exercises 
its powers through national law. Therefore, we are heading for 
a merger of Union criminal law and the national criminal laws. 
In the context of the fight against fraud affecting the EU’s fi-
nancial interests, we are witnessing a progression towards the 
integration of criminal law systems. Obviously, the European 
Union and its Member States are walking a path marked by 
difficulties, but it is essential to advance towards a greater de-
gree of liberty, security, and justice.
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fences of fraud affecting the Union’s financial interests in respect of non-
procurement-related and procurement-related expenditure. Art. 3(2) lit. d) 
of the Directive defines the criminal conduct of fraud affecting the Union’s 
financial interests in respect of revenue arising from VAT own resources. 
However, the harmonisation of this VAT fraud by the Directive only ap-
plies to serious offences. Art. 2(2) of the Directive defines as “serious 
offence” the necessity that intentional acts or omissions are connected 
with the territory of two or more Member States of the Union and involve 
a total damage of at least € 10.000.000, Art. 22(1) of the EPPO Regulation 
established corresponding restrictions on the competence of the EPPO to 
prosecute these VAT offences.
21 OLAF is indispensable to protect the EU budget and to prevent fraud 
affecting the financial interests. See “Communication from the Commis-
sion to the European Parliament, The Council, the European Economic 
and Social Committee of the regions and the court of auditors – Commis-
sion Anti-Fraud Strategy: enhanced action to protect the EU budget”, 
29.4.2019, COM(2019) 196 final.
22 Eurojust and Europol can also be considered “criminal bodies” of the 
EU, however they still have only cooperation and coordination tasks in the 
area of criminal law.
included in a new statute, which aims to integrate the legisla-
tion of the different EU instruments on mutual recognition into 
a single act (called Mutual Recognition Act). This technique 
aims to guarantee better transposition and greater clarity, as 
claimed by the Spanish legislator in the preamble to the Act.1 
From 2014 onwards, every EU mutual recognition instrument 
has been transposed by an amendment to the Mutual Recogni-
tion Act. Every instrument is regulated in one of the titles of 
the Act, and three chapters can be found under each title: the 
first chapter regulates general provisions, the second one the 
